最近正在讀巴菲特給股東的信，從1957開始。當(dāng)時(shí)巴菲特還只是一個(gè)27歲的青年投資者，僅有兩年正式的職業(yè)投資經(jīng)驗(yàn)。1954-1956年，巴菲特曾經(jīng)在格雷厄姆的投資公司工作。在那之前，巴菲特提出免費(fèi)給格雷厄姆工作，但遭到了拒絕。他給股東的信忠實(shí)的記錄了一個(gè)投資者成長(zhǎng)的歷程。
 
        在1957-1961年的信中，有幾段話吸引了我的注意：
 
        基金的目標(biāo)
 
       “My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve along-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more orless parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.”
 
      “我管理合伙基金的一貫?zāi)繕?biāo)是取得優(yōu)于道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)的長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)。我堅(jiān)信這一平均指數(shù)在長(zhǎng)期將與領(lǐng)先的投資公司的業(yè)績(jī)相類似。除非我們?nèi)〉眠@樣優(yōu)異的業(yè)績(jī)，否則我們的合伙基金沒(méi)有理由存在下去?！?
 　
      （1960年給合伙人的信）
 　
        巴菲特最初的目標(biāo)是長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)超越指數(shù)。這個(gè)目標(biāo)至今沒(méi)有改變。
 
        如何獲得超越市場(chǎng)的業(yè)績(jī)
 　
      “However,I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.”
 
        “但是，我曾經(jīng)指出，即使我們可能取得優(yōu)秀的業(yè)績(jī)，這也不能證明我們能保持相對(duì)穩(wěn)定的對(duì)道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。如果我們獲得優(yōu)勢(shì)，也是通過(guò)在平穩(wěn)或下跌市場(chǎng)中超出平均的業(yè)績(jī)，在上漲的市場(chǎng)中獲得平均業(yè)績(jī)，甚至有可能是遜于平均的業(yè)績(jī)而達(dá)到?！?BR> 
        （1960年給合伙人的信）
 
         巴菲特告訴自己的合伙人，自己超越市場(chǎng)不是持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的超越，具有穩(wěn)定的優(yōu)勢(shì)，而是在市場(chǎng)不好時(shí)超越，在市場(chǎng)狂熱時(shí)表現(xiàn)一般，甚至遜色。換句話說(shuō)，戰(zhàn)勝市場(chǎng)不是多贏，而是少輸?！?
 
        衡量業(yè)績(jī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)
 
         “I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.

I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
 
        While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market.”
 
        “我堅(jiān)信在行動(dòng)前制定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。因?yàn)槭潞笤倏?，幾乎任何事情，相?duì)于某些其他事物，都能顯得很好?！　?
 
         我一直用道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)作為我們衡量的基準(zhǔn)。我感覺(jué)三年是檢驗(yàn)業(yè)績(jī)的最短時(shí)間。最佳的檢驗(yàn)至少要包括三年的時(shí)間，而道瓊斯指數(shù)的終值與初始值相當(dāng)接近?！?
 
        雖然道瓊斯指數(shù)并不是衡量業(yè)績(jī)的完美指標(biāo)（任何事物都不是），但這個(gè)指數(shù)有著廣為人知，長(zhǎng)期的連續(xù)性，以及相當(dāng)準(zhǔn)確的反映了市場(chǎng)投資者情況的優(yōu)勢(shì)?！薄　?
 
        （1961年給合伙人的信）　　
 
         巴菲特選取指數(shù)是為了有一個(gè)公平的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。而且，他認(rèn)為要評(píng)價(jià)投資業(yè)績(jī)最少要三年的時(shí)間，而且最好是在這段時(shí)間里市場(chǎng)持平。這樣才能體現(xiàn)出投資的真實(shí)業(yè)績(jī)，而不是短期運(yùn)氣，或者隨著市場(chǎng)水漲船高?！?
 
        保守的投資

“Many people so me years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.　
 
         Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.”　　
 
          “True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.”　　
 
           “多年前很多人認(rèn)為購(gòu)買中期或者長(zhǎng)期政府債券是最保守的做法。這種方式造成了大量的損失，而且肯定無(wú)法保持或者增加真實(shí)購(gòu)買力?！?
 
           由于意識(shí)到通脹，甚至過(guò)于擔(dān)心通脹，很多人認(rèn)為他們不顧市盈率、股息率等指標(biāo)購(gòu)買大型藍(lán)籌股是保守的做法。即使不考慮過(guò)去債券的例子，我也認(rèn)為這種做法充滿危險(xiǎn)。在我看來(lái)，投機(jī)毫無(wú)保守可言，投機(jī)只不過(guò)是猜想貪婪而變化無(wú)常的公眾能給盈利多高的倍數(shù)。”　　
 
          “真正的保守惟有通過(guò)知識(shí)和理性才有可能?！薄?
 
           （1961年給合伙人的信）　　
 
            50年前的忠告同樣適合今天的人們。不顧租售比，不考慮價(jià)格買房的人并不是在通脹條件下進(jìn)行保守的保值投資。預(yù)期房?jī)r(jià)不斷上漲，其實(shí)就是預(yù)期貪婪而變化無(wú)常的公眾將給房子支付更高的價(jià)格。

  內(nèi)在價(jià)值的回歸與賣出時(shí)機(jī)
 
          被低估股票的價(jià)格何時(shí)能回歸內(nèi)在價(jià)值？如何才能回歸內(nèi)在價(jià)值？在什么情況下要賣出所投資的股票？巴菲特的回答如下：
 
        “Some times these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.”
 
         “有時(shí)候很快就能實(shí)現(xiàn)。更多的時(shí)候，需要幾年。在買入的時(shí)候很難知道有哪一個(gè)具體的原因讓股票價(jià)格應(yīng)該上漲。但是，正是由于這種缺乏魅力或者沒(méi)有期待，才有可能創(chuàng)造出當(dāng)前有利的市場(chǎng)機(jī)會(huì)。這些股票可以用非常便宜的價(jià)格獲得。通過(guò)支付低價(jià)，我們能獲得很多價(jià)值。這種大量的超額價(jià)值在每個(gè)交易中創(chuàng)造出一個(gè)相當(dāng)大的安全邊際。這種個(gè)股的安全邊際加上投資的分散性，創(chuàng)造出了一個(gè)最有吸引力的組合，具有安全性和升值潛力。在過(guò)去幾年，我們買入的時(shí)間點(diǎn)一直遠(yuǎn)好于賣出的時(shí)機(jī)。我們買入這些股票時(shí)并沒(méi)有想獲得最后一分錢的利潤(rùn)。我們往往滿足于在買入價(jià)和合理價(jià)位中間賣掉。我們認(rèn)為的合理價(jià)位是對(duì)私人業(yè)主來(lái)說(shuō)公平的價(jià)格?！?
 
         (1961年給合伙人的信)
 
          價(jià)值投資的安全性 
 
          價(jià)值投資的安全性不是來(lái)自于高超的賣點(diǎn)選擇，而是來(lái)自于買入的低價(jià)。 
 
          By buying assets at a bargain price, we don't need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”
 
         通過(guò)低價(jià)買入資產(chǎn)，我們無(wú)需施展魔術(shù)才能得到非常好的百分比回報(bào)。我們投資哲學(xué)的基石是：“絕不指望好的賣出。而是讓購(gòu)買價(jià)格如此之誘人，即使一個(gè)平庸的賣出也能帶來(lái)良好的回報(bào)。更好的賣出將會(huì)是錦上添花?！?
 
         (1962年給合伙人的信)
 
         股市下跌的情況
 
         價(jià)值投資，安全邊際，購(gòu)買便宜的股票也不能避免下跌。市場(chǎng)漲跌左右短期表現(xiàn)。
 
         The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
 
          我們的股票傾向與市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)一致。便宜并不意味著不會(huì)進(jìn)一步下跌。在市場(chǎng)突然下跌的時(shí)候，這些股票完全可能與道瓊斯指數(shù)一樣，下降同樣的百分比。從長(zhǎng)期看，我相信這些股票將超過(guò)道瓊斯指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)。在1961年那樣猛烈上漲的市場(chǎng)，這部分股票在我們的投資組合中表現(xiàn)是最佳的。當(dāng)然，在一個(gè)下跌的市場(chǎng)，這部分也是最容易受到損失的。
 
         (1961年給合伙人的信)
 
         對(duì)投資人的承諾 
 
         結(jié)果無(wú)法保證，目標(biāo)可以承諾，投入全部身家，與合伙人利益保持高度一致。
 
         I can not promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:

a.Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;
 
         b.That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity ofcommitments;and

c.My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.
 
         我無(wú)法對(duì)合伙人承諾結(jié)果。我能夠承諾而且確定承諾的是：
 
         a.我們投資的選擇是基于價(jià)值，而不是流行。
 
         b.我們會(huì)試圖把資本永久損失（而不是短期賬面損失）的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降到絕對(duì)最低。而這是通過(guò)每個(gè)投資的大的安全邊際和投資的分散性達(dá)到的。
 
        c.我的妻子，孩子和我將把我們幾乎全部的凈值都投資在合伙基金中。
 
         (1962年給合伙人的信)
 
         對(duì)投資業(yè)績(jī)的檢驗(yàn)
 
         市場(chǎng)下跌是對(duì)投資是否保守的客觀考驗(yàn)。無(wú)需患得患失，少輸勝過(guò)多贏。
 
          I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow.
 
         我認(rèn)為通過(guò)評(píng)估在下跌市場(chǎng)中的業(yè)績(jī)，我們可以得到最客觀的關(guān)于投資方式有多保守的檢驗(yàn)。最好是道瓊斯指數(shù)下跌很多的時(shí)候。
 
        (1962年給合伙人的信) 

       Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
 
        我們的任務(wù)是積累年復(fù)一年超越道瓊斯指數(shù)的業(yè)績(jī)，而不是過(guò)度擔(dān)心某一年的絕對(duì)結(jié)果是正還是負(fù)。我認(rèn)為道指下跌25%而我們只下跌15%的一年要遠(yuǎn)好于道指和我們都上漲20%的一年。 
        (1962年給合伙人的信)