價(jià)值投資君丨查理·芒格就危機(jī)發(fā)聲：現(xiàn)在應(yīng)謹(jǐn)慎行事，而不是積極行動！

以下是中英文對照全文：

Charlie Munger: ‘The Phone Is Not Ringing Off the Hook’

查理·芒格:“我和沃倫的電話沒有響個(gè)不?！?/strong>

If the coronavirus lockdown has frozen your investing plans, you’re in good company. Charlie Munger is watching and waiting, too.

如果新冠疫情使你的投資計(jì)劃不得不暫時(shí)停止，你并不孤單，因?yàn)椴槔怼っ⒏褚苍谟^望和等待。

Mr. Munger, vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and Warren Buffett’s longtime business partner, likes to say that one of the keys to great investing results is “sitting on your ass.” That means doing nothing the vast majority of the time, but buying with “aggression” when bargains abound.

芒格先生是伯克希爾哈撒韋公司副主席，是沃倫?巴菲特的長期商業(yè)伙伴，他喜歡說，取得成功的關(guān)鍵之一是“不要操作”，這意味著絕大多數(shù)時(shí)候什么也不做，而在有便宜貨的時(shí)候“積極”地加倉。

I spoke this week by phone with Mr. Munger, who turned 96 years old on Jan. 1. He sounded as sharp and vigorous as ever, and as usual he drew bright lines between what he’s fairly certain of and what he thinks belongs in the “too-hard pile”—where he and Mr. Buffett consign questions they don’t know how to answer. Overall, Mr. Munger made it clear that he regards this as a time for caution rather than action.

我這周和芒格先生通了電話，他在今年1月1日時(shí)年滿96歲，聲音和以前一樣清晰而且充滿活力。與以往一樣，他在確定性的事情和“比較難的事情”中間化了很清晰的界限，這也是他和巴菲特面對不知如何回答的問題時(shí)的慣常做法?？傊⒏穹浅Ｃ鞔_地表示，現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該謹(jǐn)慎行事，而不是采取行動。

In 2008-09, the years of the last financial crisis, Berkshire spent tens of billions of dollars investing in (among others) General Electric Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and buying Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. outright.

2008年至2009年，也就是上一次金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)的那幾年，伯克希爾斥資數(shù)百億美元投資于通用電氣(General Electric Co.)、高盛集團(tuán)(Goldman Sachs Group Inc.)，還收購了Burlington Northern Santa Fe 公司（本刊注：BNSF公司運(yùn)營北美洲最大的鐵路之一）。

以下是對話實(shí)錄：

一

Will Berkshire step up now to buy businesses on the same scale?

伯克希爾·哈撒韋會像2008、2009年那樣進(jìn)行同樣規(guī)模收購嗎?

“Well, I would say basically we’re like the captain of a ship when the worst typhoon that’s ever happened comes,” Mr. Munger told me. “We just want to get through the typhoon, and we’d rather come out of it with a whole lot of liquidity. We’re not playing, ‘Oh goody, goody, everything’s going to hell, let’s plunge 100% of the reserves [into buying businesses].’”

“嗯，我想說，當(dāng)有史以來最嚴(yán)重的臺風(fēng)來臨時(shí)，我們就像一位船長?！泵⒏裾f到，“我們只想逃離臺風(fēng)，我們寧愿帶著大量的流動性沖出去，我們很認(rèn)真的對待，這不是鬧著玩的?！芭?，太好了，一切都要完蛋了，我們想把100%的現(xiàn)金留著去收購企業(yè)。”

He added, “Warren wants to keep Berkshire safe for people who have 90% of their net worth invested in it. We’re always going to be on the safe side. That doesn’t mean we couldn’t do something pretty aggressive or seize some opportunity. But basically we will be fairly conservative. And we’ll emerge on the other side very strong.”

他補(bǔ)充道：“為了那些把90%凈資產(chǎn)都投資于伯克希爾的人，沃倫希望伯克希爾是安全的。我們總是站在安全的這一邊，但這并不意味著我們不能做一些積極的操作或抓住一些機(jī)會?；旧?，我們是相對保守的，但也會在市場有明確安全預(yù)期時(shí)進(jìn)場?！?/p>

二

Surely hordes of corporate executives must be calling Berkshire begging for capital?

肯定有很多公司高管打電話給伯克希爾，想要你們投資吧?

“No, they aren’t,” said Mr. Munger. “The typical reaction is that people are frozen. Take the airlines. They don’t know what the hell’s doing. They’re all negotiating with the government, but they’re not calling Warren. They’re frozen. They’ve never seen anything like it. Their playbook does not have this as a possibility.”

“不，他們沒有”，芒格說，“在危機(jī)下，人們最典型的反應(yīng)是，好像都被嚇住了。以航空公司為例，他們不知道該怎么辦，他們都在和政府談判，沒有人給沃倫打電話。他們的生產(chǎn)活動被凍結(jié)了，他們從來沒見過這樣的事，他們也沒想到過這種可能性?！?/p>

He repeated for emphasis, “Everybody’s just frozen. And the phone is not ringing off the hook. Everybody’s just frozen in the position they’re in.”

他重復(fù)了一遍，強(qiáng)調(diào)說:“所有人好像都被嚇住了，而且我和沃倫的電話也沒有響個(gè)不停，每個(gè)人好像被困在了原地?！?/p>

With Berkshire’s vast holdings in railroads, real estate, utilities, insurance and other industries, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger may have more and better data on U.S. economic activity than anyone else, with the possible exception of the Federal Reserve. But Mr. Munger wouldn’t even hazard a guess as to how long the downturn might last or how bad it could get.

伯克希爾在鐵路、房地產(chǎn)、公用事業(yè)、保險(xiǎn)和其他行業(yè)持有大量股份。巴菲特和芒格先生可能比其他人（除了美聯(lián)儲以外）有更多、更準(zhǔn)確的關(guān)于美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的數(shù)據(jù)。但芒格也不敢猜測經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷會持續(xù)多久，或者會變得有多糟糕。

“Nobody in America’s ever seen anything else like this,” said Mr. Munger. “This thing is different. Everybody talks as if they know what’s going to happen, and nobody knows what’s going to happen.”

“在美國，從來沒有人見過這樣的事情”，芒格說，“（疫情）與以往任何事情都不同。每個(gè)人都說他們知道會發(fā)生什么，但沒有人知道會發(fā)生什么。”

三

Is another Great Depression possible?

可能會出現(xiàn)另一場大蕭條嗎?

“Of course we’re having a recession,” said Mr. Munger. “The only question is how big it’s going to be and how long it’s going to last. I think we do know that this will pass. But how much damage, and how much recession, and how long it will last, nobody knows.”

“當(dāng)然，我們正在經(jīng)歷一場衰退，”芒格說，“唯一的問題是它影響范圍有多大，持續(xù)時(shí)間有多長，但我們確切地知道這件事會過去。而具體會造成多少損失、衰退的程度有多大、會持續(xù)多久卻沒有人知道?！?/p>

He added, “I don’t think we’ll have a long-lasting Great Depression. I think government will be so active that we won’t have one like that. But we may have a different kind of a mess. All this money-printing may start bothering us.”

他補(bǔ)充道:“我不認(rèn)為我們會出現(xiàn)長期的大蕭條，政府會采取積極的舉措避免出現(xiàn)大蕭條。但我們會進(jìn)入一段混亂的時(shí)期，美聯(lián)儲的‘印鈔’行為會對我們有所困擾?！?/p>

四

Can the government reduce its role in the economy once the virus is under control?

如果病毒得到控制，政府會降低其在經(jīng)濟(jì)中的干預(yù)作用嗎？

“I don’t think we know exactly what the macroeconomic consequences are going to be,” said Mr. Munger. “I do think, sooner or later, we’ll have an economy back, which will be a moderate economy. It’s quite possible that never again—not again in a long time—will we have a level of employment again like we just lost. We may never get that back for all practical purposes. I don’t know.”

“我們并不確切地知道會有哪些宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的后果，”芒格說，“但我認(rèn)為，早晚經(jīng)濟(jì)將會復(fù)蘇，那將會是溫和的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。就業(yè)水平很可能再也恢復(fù)不到疫情發(fā)生前的水平，可能因?yàn)榉N種原因，我們永遠(yuǎn)也回不到之前的就業(yè)率水平了，我不知道。”

Berkshire won’t escape unscathed. “This will cause us to shutter some businesses,” Mr. Munger said. “We have a few bad businesses that...we could be tolerant of as members of the family. Somebody else would have already shut them down. We’ve got a few businesses, small ones, we won’t reopen when this is over.”

伯克希爾不會毫發(fā)無損，芒格說：“這場危機(jī)會使我們關(guān)閉一些業(yè)務(wù)。我們有一些經(jīng)營不善的生意……作為（伯克希爾）家族企業(yè)中的一員，我們可以容忍（它們），但如果是其他企業(yè)，則已經(jīng)被關(guān)閉了。我們有一些規(guī)模小的企業(yè)，關(guān)閉后將不會再開業(yè)了?！?/p>

Mr. Munger told me: “I don’t have the faintest idea whether the stock market is going to go lower than the old lows or whether it’s not.” The coronavirus shutdown is “something we have to live through,” letting the chips fall where they may, he said. “What else can you do?”

芒格先生告訴我：“我完全不知道股市會不會創(chuàng)下新低?！彼f，因?yàn)楣跔畈《編淼娜珖綦x是我們必須要做的事情，只能順其自然了?！澳氵€能做什么呢？”

Investors can take a few small steps to restore a sense of control—by harvesting tax losses, for instance—but, for now, sitting still alongside Mr. Munger seems the wisest course.

投資者目前可以通過小幅的操作來恢復(fù)控制感，但是，就目前而言，和芒格先生保持一致似乎是最明智的做法。 

注：文章中文部分為有道翻譯及《紅周刊》記者（何艷/李健/林偉萍）編譯相結(jié)合內(nèi)容。

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